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Introduction
The purpose of the ensuing pages is to analyse the relationship between the financial structure and the flexibility of the vertical organization of a corporate enterprise. By vertical flexibility we mean the opportunity for a firm to buy inputs from the market, i.e., to do outsourcing (OS) in a variable and reversible manner, going back to internal production if necessary. The organizational aspects of OS and flexibility are crucial for most firms which buy inputs in different and variable proportions and change quite often the extension of activity along the vertical chain of the producion process. Flexibility improves the ability to cope with uncertain scenarios and has considerable effects on competitiveness, scale of production and social efficiency 1 . OS and flexibility do not come for free since the acquisition of inputs from the market requires the setting up of a supply chain with specific logistic investment. A vertically flexible firm decides to substitute an internally produced input with an externally provided one while keeping the option of bringing back in-house (backsourcing or reshoring) the same production. In such a case it must keep alive a dedicated internal facility and the associated know-how. As a matter of fact, flexibility may turn out to be quite dear. Moreover, the costs of flexibility may be affected by technical progress, by efficiency of external markets, i.e., the opportunity of buying easily inputs from producers which may be specialized or located in low cost countries and, last but not the least, by the design of a proper capital budgeting. This final aspect is crucial: each firm should try to finance vertical flexibility in the best way in terms of the mix between equity, debt and other possible financial sources such as venture capital 2 . Unfortunately this financial aspect is often sidestepped in the analysis of both vertical relationships and flexibility since funding and organization themes are studied separately in financial 3 , managerial, industrial organization and operations research literature 4 . This partly unexplored field requires to analyse jointly finance and vertical organization issues. On the real side we shall be concerned with the extent and the type of vertical flexibility, that can be secured by arms' length OS of inputs while maintaining in all cases a partial in-house prudential production. On the financial side we shall see how the mix between equity and debt or the participation of a venture capitalist may affect the extent of flexibility acquired and the time sequence of the investment in flexibility. Financial sources may be represented by new equity, debt (convertible or nonconvertible) or by a venture capitalist. We exclude from our investigation new equity raised through an IPO (initial public offering) since it tends to reduce the price of existing stock and may open the way to a loss of control 5 .
Since flexible technologies reduce risk (profit volatility) they may be considered as a kind of (real) option and their price should reflect their (option) value (Amran and Kulatilaka, 1999, Ch. 1 In a strategic environment the amount of flexibility adopted by interacting firms (Yoshida, 2012) affects uncertainty which becomes endogeneously determined. The more flexible is a firm the more uncertain becomes the scenario for the rival. In our analysis we disregard strategic market interactions. Therefore, uncertainty is exogeneous and is not dependent upon flexibility. 2 Other financial channels may be activated by a firm. For the sake of simplicity we confine to debt, equity and the involvment of a venture capitalist. 3 See, for a good survey of main related issues, Tirole (2006) . 4 See Van Mieghen (1999), Wang, Liu and Wang (2007) , Moretto and Rossini (2012) where a good deal of literature on these latter aspects is surveyed. 5 See Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007).
2 16 ). As a result the presumption is that the value of a vertically flexible firm be weakly larger than the value of a corresponding non flexible firm. Yet, we shall see that this is not always the case whenever the cost of flexibility and the related financial aspects are properly taken into account. Our investigation is prompted by broad casual observation and press reports 6 showing that most firms change over time their vertical production structure, expanding and/or subsequently reducing (or the other way round) the extent of OS of inputs 7 . For instance in the automotive industry most brands adopt partial OS, i.e., concomitant internal production and purchase of engines and other intermediate products from external sources. Moreover, the extent of OS is frequently changed as witnessed by the variable level of value added over revenue found in balance sheets and, indirectly, in everydays news. Since different organizational settings exhibit distinct degrees of risk it is worth seeing how the financial choices affect the degree of flexibility acquired.
Literature has recently examined vertical flexibility (Shy and Stenbacka, 2005; Alvarez and Stenbacka, 2007; Moretto and Rossini, 2012; Yoshida, 2012) scantly going into the relationship with capital structure. Contributions on the link between industrial decisions and financial structure may be found in Lederer and Singhal (1994) , in Leland (1998) Leland (1998) digs the same topic raised in the seminal paper of Jensen and Meckling (1976) . Unlike Leland (1998), Mauer and Sarkar (2005) emphasize the inefficiency of debt. In the traditional Modigliani and Miller (1958) scenario the value of a firm is given by the sum of its liabilities. Equity and debt turn out to be quite close (in certain circumstances, perfect) substitutes. However, equityholders and debtholders do not usually coincide and each group maximizes a different objective function. Shareholders maximize the equity value while debtholders maximize the debt value. The consequence is a subadditive result. Only a "social planner" would rather maximize the sum of debt and equity pursuing a first best. Mauer and Sarkar (2005) calculate the agency cost of debt as the difference between the total value of a firm where each group of stakeholders optimizes separately and the case where the whole value of the firm is jointly maximized. Equityholders, in a limited liability legal framework, tend to overinvest if they do not face the proper agency cost of debt confirming the old Jensen and Meckling (1976) wisdom. The issue of going back and forth from (complete) OS to vertical integration is studied in Benaroch and al. (2012) who analyse the particular case of service production. OS may allow a firm facing volatile demand to avoid the risk of bearing fixed costs that cannot be easily covered. By (complete) OS of services which are capital intensive the firm turns a fixed into a variable cost cutting risk. If it wants to go back to internal production it must bear each time a fixed cost. While in our model we go through the privately optimal (hence, variable) extent of OS contingent upon the capital structure adopted, in the Benaroch et al. (2012) paper the main question is about the optimal switching from (complete) OS to backsource and 6 For instance Apple has recently increased the OS of some inputs while reducing and bringing back home other inputs. See for further examples: The Economist (2011, 2013), Forbes (2012).See also empirical assesments in Klein (2005) and Rossini and Ricciardi (2005) . 7 Examples may found in Benaroch et al. (2012) .
3 the value of the switching option, which is bound to increase with demand volatility and the skill intensity of the production process of the input. In Banerjee et al. (2014) the investment in a new technology, such as a flexible vertical process, financed by an external subject is seen as a joint option. Size of the investment, timing of the exercise of the option and rule concerning the sharing of returns of the investment have to be established jointly by the firm and by the financial investor. According to Banerjee et al. (2014) it is inefficient to specify a sharing mode before the venture is carried out. Bakhtiari and Breunig (2014) , at firm level on longitudinal data, assess OS as a device to smooth demand uncertainty. They find an asymmetric link with demand fluctuations, i.e., OS increases substantially during slumps while does not respond much to demand increases. Some scanty data investigation on the financial counterpart of OS is attempted but it is fairly inconclusive. OS appears definitely as a shield against market contraction. In Moon and Phillips (2014) a higher level of OS makes the firm less risky in terms of cash flows. The result is a capital structure with less debt and more equity mainly in high value-added industries.
In the ensuing pages we are going to consider two alternative cases. In the first the control right over the investment decision is allocated to the firm (i.e., the shareholders), while in the second case the control belongs with an outside investor (i.e., a venture capitalist). As in Banerjee et al. (2014) both actors agree in advance over the sharing rule of the project value. While the timing of the investment is determined by one party the terms of the investment are determined by both parties. In both cases the level of OS is always set by the operating party.
As to the financial terms of the investment, in the first case we shall be concerned with debt financing. To overcome the agency problem of debt, the lender is granted an option to buy out the firm if OS becomes the main source of profits for shareholders and in-house production gets almost irrelevant. The alternative case considers a pure equity offer: ownership is shared with an outside investor (venture capitalist) without side payments (i.e., no debt service by the firm).
In our endeavor we shall couple two streams of contributions: one on vertical flexibility and the timing of adoption of a specific technology to carry out OS (Moretto and Rossini, 2012; Shy and Stenbacka, 2005; Alvarez and Stenbacka, 2007; Alipranti, Miliou and Petrakis, 2014) and another on financial choices of a firm in an uncertain dynamic framework (Leland, 1994; Lederer and Singhal, 1994; Banerjee et al., 2014; Triantis and Hodder, 1990) .
With debt the firm may rush to adopt flexibility, but it may be hard to finance it unless the lender gets as a collateral an option to buy the entire firm in case flexibility turns out not to be profitable enough. The result is that (warranted) debt makes a firm invest earlier in the vertically flexible technology. When a venture capitalist is involved, again the investment occurs earlier but the extent of OS is lower than with pure equity.
The paper roadmap is the following: in section 2 we see the basic model, in section 3 we go through the value of a vertically flexible firm in the control case without debt, in section 4 we introduce debt, in section 5 we go through the case of venture capital. The epilogue is in section 6.
2 The basic set up
We consider the internal organization of a vertically flexible enterprise that for each unit of output to be produced needs one unit of a perfectly divisible input (perfect vertical complementarity). The firm has to decide whether to buy a vertically flexible technology that allows to manufacture the input in-house at the constant marginal cost d, to resort (totally or partially) to OS, in case the market price of the input, c t , is low enough, and to reverse the choice over time (backsourcing), if c t goes up to a sufficient extent. In the specific, the enterprise, at any time, can switch from totally making the input in-house whenĉ t ≡ αc t + (1 − α)d rises above d, to partially purchasing it ifĉ t falls below d and viceversa, where α ∈ (0, 1] is the outsourced share (its complement to one is the home produced portion).
Then, assuming, for the sake of tractability, that there are no fixed costs in the production of the input, the instantaneous profit function can be written as: 8
where p is the output market price. When α < 1 the firm uses a linear combination of produced and procured input. It can go back to vertical integration ifĉ t becomes too high. Finally, to avoid default, we assume that p − d > 0. 9 The sunk cost of the flexible technology is given by: 10
where k 1 is the direct cost to keep internal facilities working (i.e., the cost of maintenance and updating the process for the internal production of the input) with total or partial OS. The term
2 α 2 is the organizational cost to design and run a system devoted to obtain a cost advantage from a vertically flexible technology and to procure the input from the market (Simester and Knez, 2002) . That requires setting up a supply chain of subcontractors, monitoring input quality and contract enforcement and so on. We do not consider investment in capacity expansion, i.e., we assume that capacity is already employed to meet demand in the best way producing the input in-house. The cost to keep in operation the internal facilites is fixed whilst the organizational cost grows as the extent of OS 8 Fixed costs would not change qualitatively our conclusions. They give rise to a hysteresis interval in the option to switch from producing the input in-house to outsourcing it. See Benaroch et al. (2012) for the consideration of fixed costs. 9 Vertical flexibility, as stressed in the introduction, is an insurance against risk based on the maintanance of the know how and the facilities to produce the input in house. This assumption allows us to focus on differential arrangements to finance and to see how they affect the decision as to whether and when to invest in the flexible technology and as to the extent of OS.
1 0 The sunk cost to build up the mixed technology is assumed quadratic only for the sake of simplicity. None of the results is altered if the investment cost is of type I(α) = k1+ k2α δ with δ > 1 as in Alvarez and Stenbacka (2007).
tends towards its maximal level 11 . Therefore, we explicitly esclude the case α = 0 with k 1 > 0. 12 Notice that, when α = 1, the firm buys the input entirely from an independent provider, while keeping the option of returning to complete internal manufacturing. 13 The scenario is one of dynamic uncertainty where the input market price c t follows a geometric Brownian motion 14 :
where dz t is the increment of a Wiener process (or Brownian motion) uncorrelated over time, σ the istantaneous volatility of the market input price and γ the drift parameter. 15 Finally, as anticipated in the introduction, we assume that the firm may finance the required investment for the flexible technology in two alterantive ways. 1) By debt, which may become convertible since it contains an option on the existing shares. 2) By venture capital to finance the production of the input. In both cases the constant discount factor is r. Shareholders, lenders and venture capitalists are all assumed to be risk neutral. 16 3 The benchmark case: an unlevered vertically flexible or pure equity enterprise
As a benchmark, we consider the optimal OS share and the optimal investment policy of a firm entirely financed by equityholders (i.e., the unlevered firm value).
The operating value
We go through the operating firm's value in two distinct cases. In the first we consider a vertically integrated firm manufacturing the input in house, ifĉ t > d, keeping the option of buying it. In the second case we see an enterprise which adopts OS, ifĉ t < d, acquiring a share α of the input while making in-house the remaining 1 − α, keeping the option to manufacture the whole input requirement, ifĉ t goes further up. Since, for α > 0, the conditionĉ t > d implies c t > d , standard arguments lead to a general solution for the unlevered operating firm's value taking the following functional form (See Appendix A):
where β 2 < 0 and β 1 > 1 are, respectively, the negative and the positive roots of the characteristic 
If α → 0, the firm is vertically integrated, bothÃ andB → 0. If α → 1 the input is bought entirely from an independent provider. Even in this extreme case, the firm has the option to switch to internal production that (represented byBc β 1 t ) makes for a larger value of the firm than without the reversal opportunity.
The optimal OS share and investment timing
Let's now derive both the optimal investment timing and OS. The firm optimally sets the proportion of OS once the investment in the flexible technology is carried out. Therefore, by working backward, we determine the optimal α. We consider the case of a firm manufacturing in-house the input, while holding the option to switch to OS, at a future date, if c t becomes lower than d. 17 Then, with c t > d, the problem is to select α that maximizes (4) minus the cost of setting up a dedicated production organization consistent with OS, i.e.:
where I(α) is given by (1) . Solving (6) we get:
Since ∂α * U ∂ct < 0, if c t is low it is better to choose complete OS, while, as c t increases α goes down and tends to zero for high values of c t . In other words, as c t rises it becomes less likely that it will fall enough to justify investment in flexibility.
Let's now turn to the optimal investment policy. Denoting by c * U the input price triggering investment, the value of the option to invest (i.e. the ex-ante value of the firm), is given by:
where T * U = inf{t ≥ 0 | c t = c * U } is the optimal investment timing, and α * U (c * U ) is the optimal OS share at entry. The standard method used for V U can be applied again to find the general solution of (8) and to derive c * U . In particular assuming that the current value of c t is sufficiently high so that immediate investment is not optimal, we can prove that:
The ex-ante value can be written in compact notation as:
where the constant F U =Ã, while the optimal trigger is:
and the OS share is
Proof See Appendix A Notice that a solution for c * U exists if k 1 / p−d r < 1. 18 As the firm maintains the ability to produce the input in-house, the ex-ante value of the option to invest is simply given by the value of the option to do OS, once the flexible technology has been adopted, i.e.:
Further, as ∂α * U ∂c t < 0, it is evident from (9.2) and (9.3) that a necessary condition for having c * U >c U > d and then α * U < 1, is
Otherwise it is always better to set α * U = 1. In words, the firm sets α * U = 1 if in-house input production leads to profits sufficient to cover organizational costs to buy the entire input requirement.
Debt funding with a take over option (warrant)
Going through the case of debt, we assume that the firm negotiates a contract with a (financial) investor to get the funds to cover part of the cost of the flexible technology paying a fixed coupon D per year. Unlike traditional (riskless) debt financing, the shareholders grant the lender a call option to buy out the firm to make the project attracting. That may occur if operative profits become very high as the market input price has gone extremely low and the flexible technology is expected to become useless. This option may be seen as a warrant on the debt, i.e., a kind of "sweetener" for the investor. 19 The sequence of moves, in this case, is the following: first the firm and the lender decide the terms of the contract (i.e., the coupon and the buy out option in the covenant). Then, the firm optimally sets both the level of flexibility α and the investment timing while the lender chooses how much to lend and when to buy out the firm. 20 Since the funding contract contains a specific covenant (the warrant) allowing the lender to buy out the firm it seems reasonable to assume that a rational shareholder signs the contract only if the coupon D < p − d. In addition, we assume that the lender, who takes over, to minimize risk continues production with the optimal share decided by the incumbent shareholders.
The operating value
As for the benchmark case, we first compute the market value of the production facility which is given by the sum of the market value of equity and of debt. In this case, the instantaneous profit is:
where the technology allows the firm to manufacture the input in-house with profits p − d − D ≥ 0.
Equity
Defining E (c t ; D) as the market value of the equity, the analogous general solution for the value of levered equity is:
The value of levered equity (for incumbent shareholders) is:
where β 1 > 1 and β 2 < 0 are the roots of the characteristic equation Φ(β) and c l the level of the input price that triggers the buy out by the lender.
Proof See Appendix B
As before, the termsÂc
t indicate respectively the value of the option to go from vertical integration to OS and the other way round. Differently, the termB 2 c β 2 t is the loss for the incumbent shareholders when the firm is bought out, thereforeB 2 < 0. This loss can be seen as a kind of agency cost (as in Mauer and Sarkar, 2005) , that the equity has to pay to the lender. In the absence of any agency fee shareholders would excessively increase debt since they are protected by limited liability. That puts a boundary on losses which cannot exceed equity while leaving to shareholders the opportunity of getting the upside cream, i.e., profits, in bonanza times. In other words, the option of the lender to buy out the leveraged firm decreases the equity market value. t , representing the loss due to the threat of take over by the lender, is equal to the value of the call option in the hands of the lender who has the right to buy out the firm if c t goes below c l . 21 Furthermore, by the value matching and the smooth pasting conditions at c t = d , we are able to show that (see Appendix B):
The constantB 1 is the same regardless of whether the firm has to decide only the extent of vertical flexibility or the capital structure as well. In other words, once the investment is undertaken, the option value of flexibility to go from OS to vertical integration remains the same regardless of the way it is financed. On the contrary the option value to go OS differs with respect to the unlevered firm, since it carries the risk of being taken over. Now, the constantÂ, may even turn out negative. Here, the novelty concernsB 2 which takes into account the possible buy out by the lender if the input price goes below the threshold c l . If the take over threat is not high (i.e., c l → 0) the option value of OS is definitely positive while, if the threat is quite high, it is not profitable to do OS and the relative option suffers. Then, the firm must consider the effect on its equity value of financing OS and flexibility with debt.
Debt
The market value of debt D (c t ; α), since it has no stated maturity, will be given by:
Lemma 2 The value of debt is:
(13.1)
(c l ) −β 2 > 0, while the buy out trigger is:
The take over occurs when the flexible technology is expected to become useless, i.e., when the market input price has gone substantially low to suggest that it will be better to buy the input, rather than producing it, for ever. The fresh owner will behave like the former shareholders in terms of optimal strategies adopted by the firm. This assumption is a simplication. Other possible scenarios may be featured.
Some comparative statics shows that:
The negative relationship between c l and α shows the countervailing interests of the shareholdersm vis à vis the lender. If the firm sets a low level of α (i.e., it tends to be vertically integrated), the lender would find it profitable to buy the firm, i.e., c l → d. On the contrary, if the firm adopts a high α (i.e., the input is bought mainly from an independent provider), the lender prefers not to bear the risk and sticks to the coupon D. If α is high the benefit of keeping the facility to produce in-house has a low value. As for the second comparative statics inequality it appears that an increase in the coupon (the benefit for the lender) lets the trigger price decrease, i.e., the take over becomes less likely. With a larger coupon the lender gets a higher compensation that relaxes the take over threat and is less eager to buy out the firm by converting debt into equity. The assumption p − d − D > 0 guarantees that both c l and C are positive. Finally, by Lemma 1 and 2, the market value of the levered firm is given by:
where, using (12) and (13.1), we are now able to isolate the constantsÂ andB 2 . In particular we get (See Appendix B):Â
Note that, if c l → 0 (i.e., the firm is never bought by the lender), thenÂ →Ã > 0 is always positive andB 2 → 0. We are back to the unlevered firm as in Section 4. On the contrary, if c l → d (i.e., the firm is bought the first time it does OS), thenÂ → −αd γ (r−γ) 1 r d −β 2 − C < 0 which is always negative as well asB 2 . This is a crucial result in our model: even if an option value is, by definition, always non negative, it is possible that the cost of obtaining such an option exceeds its benefits making the "strategic" value of the option negative. In this case, the cost of the option handed over to the lender may rub out the value of the option to go from vertical integration to OS reducing the equity value of the firm for shareholders. This becomes evident by substituting (15) in (14), i.e.:
where T l = inf{t ≥ 0 | c t = c l } is the buy out timing and
The value of the levered firm is equal to the unlevered firm minus the discounted value of the option to go from OS to vertical integration calculated at the buy out time. As expected, the value of the firm does not depend on debt but on the covenant contained in the contract which corresponds to a shut down option (for equityholders). In words, the value of the firm depends on the (strategic) interaction between the lender and the shareholders. If such an interaction did not exist, the value of the firm would be the sum of debt and equity and the use of debt would not erode the value of equity, i.e., V L (c t ; α) = V U (c t ; α). 23 
The optimal OS share and the investment timing
Since equityholders control both the decision about the OS share and the timing of the investment we proceed stating first α * L and then the optimal investment trigger c * L . To get the optimal α * L , equityholders maximize (11) minus the cost of setting up the production organization with partial OS:
where k ≤ I(α) is the share of the investment expenditure paid by the lender who controls the amount to loan and the buy out timing. Since a rational investor will not agree to finance the firm unless k is a (financially) fair price for the debt, we set k = D (c t ; α) for c t > c l . 24 Then, 2 2 The expected present value Et[e −r(T l −t) ] = ct c l β 2 , can be determined by using dynamic programming (see e.g.
Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, pp. 315-316). 2 3 The coupon disappears when we sum debt and equity values to obtain the entire value of the firm. 2 4 Note that the lender chooses the amount of the loan as a function of ct. That is, as in Mauer and Sarkar (2005) , the contract may be seen as a revolving credit line where the firm decides when to use it. substituting in (17), we obtain:
where V L (c t ; α) is given by (14) . As before, let's consider a firm manufacturing in-house the input, while holding the option to switch to OS. Solving (18) the optimal OS share is given by:
where A is as in (5),
∂ct < 0, if c t is low it is better to choose complete OS, while, as c t increases α goes down and tends to zero for high values of c t . Further, if c l → 0, S(α) → 0, and then α * L → α * U .
Defining with F L (c t ) the value of the option to invest in the vertically flexible technology, this is equal to (8) with T * L = inf{t ≥ 0 | c t = c * L } as the optimal investment timing. Then, going through the same steps as before, we can prove that:
Proposition 2 The ex-ante value can be written as:
, while the optimal trigger is:
and α * L , by (19) , becomes:
2), we can write the value of the option to invest in the form:
Notice that, unlike the case of pure equity, if shareholders keep the possibility to decide both the optimal OS and the timing of the investiment, the value of investing in the new technology comes from the value of the option to do OS minus the value of the option to exit held by debt holders.By direct inspection of (9.2), (21.2) and (9.3), (21.3) the following proposition summarizes the comparison with respect to the unlevered firm.
Proposition 3 The levered firm invests always earlier than the unlevered firm, i.e. :
but adopts the same proportion of outsourced input, i.e.:
Since the levered firm decides both α * L and c * L by maximizing only the value of equity, it does not care of the risk carried by the lender. Part of the investment is paid by the lender and the risk born by the equityholders is just the buy out option in the hands of the lender. In this case the equityholders have an incentive to invest as soon as possible to get a higher loan and reap the profits of OS as soon as possible.
Using (10), (21) and Proposition 3, we find that
Hence the value of the option to invest in the flexible technology is lower for the levered firm with a take over option (warrant) than for the unlevered firm, as is to be expected.
Venture capitalist involvement
Now let us assume that the firm offers to an outside investor, a venture capitalist (VC), a share of profits ψ ∈ (0, 1) (without side payments) to finance the flexible technology. This is just a take or leave offer. The VC may accept the offer together with the option to optimally decide when to implement the deal. 25 If the VC accepts, it has to decide the optimal trigger c * V to start while the equityholders decide the outsoucing share α * V .
As it appears the decision setting changes with respect to the case of debt seen before, where the equityholders retained both the decisions on the timing of the investment and the proportion of outsourced input. Now, the sequence of moves can be summarized as follows: Equityholders offer ψ, the VC decides when to invest accepting that the equityholders set α. However, as the decison on the OS share is still in the hands of the equityholders, the VC agrees to parteciapte only for the direct cost to keep internal facilities working.
Since entry takes place as usual at c t > d, with the firm initially producing the input inhouse, proceeding backward the equityholders first decide the OS share conditional on c t . Then the VC knows the reaction function α * V (c t ) and decides the optimal trigger c * V . Equityholders may anticipate their offer ψ that could be announced even before entry takes place, i.e., at t.
The problem for the equityholders is to select the optimal α that maximizes (4) minus the cost of the technology after the financial cost:
where ζ ∈ [0, 1] is the share of the investiment financed by VC. Solving (23) yields:
Now, defining F V (c t ) as the value of the option to invest by the VC and T * V = inf{t ≥ 0 | c t = c * V } as the optimal investment timing, we can prove that:
Proposition 4 The ex-ante value of the firm is:
where the constant
and the OS share is:
Proof : See Appendix D As before substituting F V in (26.1) we see that the value of the option to invest is equal to the option to go OS multiplied by 2ψ. So only if ψ = 1 2 the shareholders and the VC evenly split the market value of the firm and the value of the option to invest is equal to the value of the option to outsource. Unlike previous cases, the condition for the existence and the finiteness of the optimal trigger is ψ >
, while the necessary condition for having c * V >c V and then α * V < 1, is now
2 . Notice that , as it is to be expected, for values of ψ tending to the extremes of the feasible interval (
, it is optimal for equityholders to give up the flexible technology, i.e. α * V → 0.
If ψ → 1 equityholders are selling the firm to VC, in this case it makes no sense to invest in a flexible technology. On the contrary, if equityholders announce a small profit share, i.e., ψ →
the VC invests immediately to reap the profits as soon as possible. However, investing in a flexible technology with a high c t is too risky and the equityholders choose zero flexibility. 26 The comparison with respect to the unlevered firm is summarized in the following proposition: 2 6 This is consistend with the comparative statics of (26.2) and (26.3) . That is, 
Proposition 5 If the flexible technology is partially financed by a venture capitalist, then:
where ψ 1 is the positive root of Ψ(ψ) = 2ψ
While, if
Proof : See Appendix E When ψ is low, i.e., ψ ∈ (
, the VC enters earlier than the unlevered firm. With ψ low, the VC is better off anticipating the time he will receive the "sure" profits from producing in-house. On the contrary, if ψ is high, i.e., ψ ∈ (ψ 1 , 1), the option value to wait for "expected" higher profits from OS prevails and the VC enters later than the unlevered firm. In addition, the equityholders choose a lower level of OS with respect to the unlevered firm if
2−ζ which, consistently with the previuos result, it is alwyas satisfied if ψ < ξ.
Using (10) and Proposition 4, we find that: 27
Unlike the preceding case, the value of the option to invest for the VC may be higher than the option for the unlevered firm. This may occur in the odd case where ψ is much higher than ζ. The intuition: the higher the share of profits going to the VC vis à vis the capital commitment the higher is the value of the option to invest in the firm for the VC.
Finally, an open question is the determination of the share parameter ψ. The equityholders may set ψ, maximizing the portion of value they keep. 28 In this case they may announce ψ before the optimal investment timing c * V by maximizing the following function:
2 7 If in both cases α * V = α * U = 1 the ratio reduces to 2ψ 2 8 In a different environment Banerjee et al. (2014) introduce a bargaining as to the share parameter and find that it is inefficient to set it before the investment because of the emerging time inconsistency. Only a bargaining carried out after the investment may assure temporal efficiency.
Recalling that E t (e −r(T V −t) ) = ct c * V β 2 and using Proposition 4, we able to reduce the above expression to:
where c * V is given by (26.2) . Notice that feasibility requires that, for any ψ > 0, the value of the firm for the equityholders at the time of the investment be positive. On the basis of the above results it is easy to show that it is never optimal to choose a value ψ → 1 since it would imply a negative value for (28) . Therefore, consistently with the firm value maximization by equityholders ψ * must lie in the range (
Since c * V is not monotone in ψ, the optimal share cannot be investigated analitically. Then, we resort to numerical simulations. The parameter scenario we choose is given by p−d r = 100, 70, 50, with ζ = 1, 0.9, 0.6. The cost k 1 to keep internal facilities working is normalized to one while the convex component of the organizational cost k 2 2 is set to 50. 29 The optimal share ψ * is described in Table 1 and for α * V in Table 2 The simulations reported in Table 1 and 2 confirm our results. The higher is p−d r , i.e., the profitability of vertical integration, the lower is the risk associated with the adoption of the flexible technology and the firm can afford much OS. This is shown in Table 2 . Moreover, if p−d r is high the shareholders will give a low share to the VC. On the contrary, if p−d r goes down, ψ * must increase to induce the VC to invest. Obviously ψ * goes down if the investment share of the VC ζ goes down, as Table 1 shows.
Moreover, we observe that the level of flexibility α * V increases as the share ζ decreases. The intuition can be seen reading together Table 1 and 2. In Tab 1 we see that ψ * goes down if the involvment of the VC goes down. Then, the equityholders will increase the level of flexibility to balance the fixed cost and the organizational cost and delay the investment. Obviuosly, if ζ → 0 then α * V → α * U and c * V → c * U .
As for the VC a further explanation may come from the comparison with Yoshida (2012) where, in a different context, the extent of flexibility chosen by one agent affects the level of uncertainty of the scenario. In a symmetric framework the more flexibility is adopted by an agent the more is chosen by the rival (flexibility is a strategic complement). The increase in (endogeneous) uncertainty associated with the extent of flexibility makes for an investment delay. In our framework this kind of simmetry is absent since the extent of flexibility is chosen (asymmetrically) only by one party, the incumbent equityholders. Their choice puts a ceiling on uncertainty making the investment occur earlier.
Epilogue
We have considered a firm that has to decide simultaneously the internal vertical setting and the financial structure in a dynamic stochastic framework. The firm we analyse is vertically flexible since it has an option to outsource entirely or partially a necessary input and it can reverse its choice by going back to in-house production, i.e., vertical integration. Unlike recent literature (Benaroch et al. 2012) we have not examined the choice of complete OS vis à vis vertically integrating, yet we have gone through a set of financial issues of a vertically flexible corporate organization where partial and reversible OS occur.
Flexibility comes with a cost required to set up a suitable supply chain and to keep alive the know how and the facilities to backsource the input in case market circumstances require to do so. We have investigated two possible financial avenues for the vertically flexible firm. First we have studied the case of debt financing. A lender may be willing to finance the firm that invests in flexibility if she gets a suitable "sweetener" such as an option to buy out the firm in case flexibility becomes useless. The option is required to make the lender willing to finance the corporate firm where limited liability may induce the incumbent equityholders to overinvest. With debt the shareholders rush to invest earlier with respect to a corresponding pure equity unlevered firm. The levered firm decides the level of OS and the timing of the invrestment while the lender sets only the size of the investment and the buy out time. Vertical flexibility is a cushion against risk but it is costly. If financial providers require collaterals which are too expensive it may not be worth. In such a case the value of a levered flexible firm may be lower than the value of an unleverd vertically unflexible firm and the strategic value of the option to become flexible may turn negative. We went through a second possible financial arrangement for the vertically flexible firm considering a venture capitalist financing the production of the necessary input. In this case it appears that the level of ousoucing is lower than in the case of the unlevered firm and the investment takes place earlier. As the share of the firm offered to the venture capitalist decreases (ψ → 0) the behaviour of the firm converges to the unlevered case. The main results are sumed up in Table 3 below:
Levered vs Unlevered Joint Venture vs Unlevered c * L < c * U c * V < c * U α * L = α * U α * V < α * U Table 3 : sum up of results for time of entry (c * ) and flexibility adopted (α * )
In the end we may say that financing flexibility with a warranted debt -the only one that is consistent with an efficient allocation of debt in the presence of limited liability -induces the firm to invest earlier but not more than the unlevered firm. Then, debt makes a firm more eager to go flexible to anticipate reaping expected profits. This is consistent with common observation suggesting that debt may accelerate innovation in organizational flexibility.
The venture capitalist case provides a bunch of suggestive results. If to the venture capitalist is given a small share of the project she will invest earlier than the unlevered firm since she aims at cashing profits as soon as possible (syndrome of the poor VC) and the amount of OS adopted is lower than in the case of debt. With the VC the firm acquires less OS. It seems that the sharing of risk that the involvment of the VC implies makes the firm less eager to have a high OS as an insurance against uncertainty. As for the optimal share of profits (or simply of the firm) to be given to the VC there exists an internal solution that makes the VC solution reasonable and implementable. A conclusion out of the epilogue should be that there is no unique way to increase flexibility in the vertical organization of a firm because the way it is financed always makes a difference. Yet debt appears not only as the easiest and handiest device but seems to be able to accelerate investment and to carry it out at a level that is not lower than that financed with internal cash flow.
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from which:
Simply, substituting (C.3) in (C.7) we obtain: where α * V (c t ) is given by (24). Substituting for V U we get:
